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DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice:
SUMMARY
1J1 Petitioner Juanita L. Gonzalez appeals a decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor
of intervenor Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Company ("Metropolitan") and denying her motions
to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention and to amend her complaint. This is an action based on
Ms. Gonzalez's petition for adjudication of marriage, brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp.
1998), regarding her relationship with Martin Briceno.^ Metropolitan moved to intervene. Ms. Gonzalez
contested the intervention but ultimately stipulated to it. Metropolitan moved for summary judgment on the
ground that Ms. Gonzalez failed to complete the adjudication of her petition within the statutory time period.
This appeal followed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings, but note the following divergence in
the justices' separate opinions concerning the issues: (1) as to the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5
(Supp. 1988) ("ONE-YEAR LIMITATION"), this opinion reflects a majority view, being concurred in by
Justices Stewart and Zimmerman; (2) as to the propriety of the trial court's refusal to dismiss Metropolitan as
an intervenor below ("INTERVENTION"), Justice Zimmerman concurs in that portion of Justice Russon's
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opinion, joined by Chief Justice Howe, but only to the extent it holds that intervention pursuant to the
stipulation was properly permitted.

BACKGROUND
1J2 According to the petition for adjudication of marriage (the "petition"), Ms. Gonzalez and Mr. Briceno began
living together in September, 1983. On October 21,1995, Briceno set fire to Gonzalez's home. Ms. Gonzalez
alleges that her relationship with Briceno "terminated" on that day. At the time, Briceno had insurance through
Metropolitan. If Gonzalez was Briceno's spouse at the time of the fire, she would have a claim under the
Metropolitan policy. Presumably, premiums were calculated on this basis.
1J3 On February 5,1996, Metropolitan filed a motion to intervene pursuant to rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Metropolitan asserted that Briceno had no reason to contest the recognition of the alleged
marriage and that Metropolitan's interest was therefore not represented in the action. In its memorandum in
support of the motion, Metropolitan stated that it moved to intervene because Gonzalez had filed the petition
"to establish her insurance claim against Metropolitan." Gonzalez opposed the motion, arguing that
Metropolitan had failed to attach a memorandum of points and authorities or appropriate affidavits, as
required under rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Gonzalez answered the intervener's
complaint on March 11, 1996. On March 12, 1996, the parties filed a Stipulation for Leave to Allow
Metropolitan to Intervene. An order granting Metropolitan leave to intervene was filed on March 12,1996.
1J4 Metropolitan formally denied Ms. Gonzalez's insurance claim on June 4, 1996. On August 7, 1996, the trial
court set a date of January 7, 1997, for trial of Ms. Gonzalez's petition, depending on the court's availability.
On October 4, 1996, Metropolitan moved for summary judgment. Its motion was based upon "the fact that
Ms. Gonzalez did not have a uniform reputation as the wife of Martin Briceno," as required under section 301-4.5 of the Utah Code. No affidavits were attached. That motion was denied.
US A minute entry of January 6, 1997, noted that the trial date, scheduled for the following day, had been
stricken. The trial was continued because of a criminal trial that took precedence on the court's calendar. On
March 18, 1997, the court ordered a new scheduling conference for April 8,1997. Trial was reset for August
5, 1997. Gonzalez never requested an accelerated trial.
1J6 On April 10, 1997, Metropolitan filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Failure to Comply with
Statutory Time Limits," in which it claimed that Ms. Gonzalez's petition should be dismissed because she
failed to obtain a judgment concerning her alleged marriage within one year of its termination, as required
under Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5. Metropolitan contended that the statutory time period ran from the date the
relationship terminated, allegedly October 21,1995, and that the statute of limitations was not tolled by filing
the action. Metropolitan did not contend, and has not argued here, that the statute of limitations expired prior
to Ms. Gonzalez's commencement of this proceeding.
1J7 In an affidavit in support of her memorandum in opposition, Gonzalez admitted that on October 21, 1995,
she considered her relationship with Briceno "permanently terminated." She also indicated, however, that "[s]
ince that time, I have re-established a relationship with Martin." Gonzalez filed a second motion to amend her
petition to allege the re-establishment of the relationship on April 23, 1997.
1J8 On May 8,1997, Gonzalez moved to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint as intervenor. She asserted that
she had stipulated to Metropolitan's intervention based on its alleged suggestion that a decision on her marital
status would dispose of all coverage questions in Briceno's insurance policy. She then argued that
Metropolitan was not a proper party under rule 24(a) because it had in fact already denied Gonzalez's
insurance claim based on lack of coverage. She asserted that Metropolitan's intervention would prejudice the
rights and social status of herself and her three children, whose father is Briceno, inasmuch as denial of her
petition would prevent all of them from "assumingQ legalrights,responsibilities and social status due them
under the circumstances of their joint relationships."
fl9 In Metropolitan's memorandum in opposition, it argued that its interest in Ms. Gonzalez's status remained,
despite its unequivocal denial of coverage to her.
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1110 After arguments on all the motions, Gonzalez's motion to amend was denied, as was her motion to
dismiss the intervener's complaint. The court granted Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment based on
Gonzalez's failure to comply with the statutory time limit,
1J11 In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint in
intervention, the court concluded that Gonzalez had "presented no valid legal basis for her withdrawal of [the]
Stipulation," thus allowing the complaint in intervention to stand. The court also ruled that Metropolitan "falls
squarely within rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding intervention." In its findings of fact
and conclusions of law regarding intervener's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the statutory
limitation period expired on October 21, 1996, which date occurred after the commencement of the action.
This date was also prior to the initial trial date set by the court.
1J12 In its conclusions of law, the trial court determined that the "petitioner is not and never has been married
to Martin Briceno in any solemnized or unsolemnized relationship."
1J13 Petitioner raises three issues on appeal. First, she argues that it was error for the trial court to grant
Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that the petition was not
adjudicated within one year of the termination of the relationship. Second, Ms. Gonzalez contends that the
trial court erred in refusing to grant her motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention. Finally, Ms.
Gonzalez argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to amend the petition to allege a
continuing relationship with Briceno.
1J14 As noted in f 1, this opinion (Durham, J.), joined by Justice Stewart and Justice Zimmerman, determines
the result regarding the statute of limitations issue. As to the intervention issue, Justice Zimmerman concurs
in that portion of Justice Russon's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Howe, but only to the extent it holds that
intervention pursuant to the stipulation was properly permitted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1115 A trial court's grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, ln_a_v,_Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). When deciding
whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, this court reviews the
facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. See id. Additionally,
because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, we give the trial court's legal conclusions no
deference and review their decision for correctness. See White v. Gary L Deeselhorst, NP SkLCorp., 879
P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994).
1J16 This court has not heretofore identified the standard it employs when reviewing a motion to intervene as
of right under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). See Limav. Chambers. 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982)
(reversing trial court's denial of intervention but not stating standard of review for that reversal). We now
adopt a de novo standard of review when intervention as of right is before us on appeal.^
ONE-YEAR LIMITATION
1J17 In 1987, the Utah Legislature enacted a statute that recognized the possibility of establishing an
unsolemnized marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp. 1998).^ Subsection two of the statute states,
in pertinent part, "The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during the
relationship described in subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of that relationship." Id. §
30-1-4.5(2) (emphasis added).
1118 The trial court found that "[mjore than one year has passed since the termination of the relationship
between Martin Briceno and the petitioner," and that Ms. Gonzalez had therefore not met the requirement that
determination of the marriage occur within one year of the relationship's termination. The trial court appeared
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to assume that the statute required completion of the proceeding, not merely its commencement, within the
one-year period. Furthermore, it put the burden of assuring a resolution of the petition on Ms. Gonzalez,
stating: "This court is just confident that if a request for expedited disposition had been [sic] in this matter,
between January and early October of 1996, we could have brought this matter to a resolution." Finally, at the
same hearing, the trial court did not permit Gonzalez a second amendment to her petition to allege a
resumption of her relationship with Briceno, which she contended would show a continuous relationship from
the time they first began living together in 1983.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
IP 9 The process of statutory interpretation is often a difficult one, as courts try to apply the terms of a statute
to an unanticipated situation. As Judge Richard Posner has pointed out:
Omniscience is always an unrealistic assumption, and particularly so when one is dealing with
the legislative process. The basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in
application is not that they are poorly drafted . . . and not that the legislators failed to agree on
just what they wanted to accomplish in the statute . . . but that a statute necessarily is drafted in
advance of, and with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its
application . . . . Matters are not decided until they have to be.
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-^ the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800,
811 (1983).
1J20 Our own legislature seems to have had the same point in mind when it included a severability clause for
chapter 246, in which the statutory marriage provision is found, stating that "if any provision of Chapter 246,
or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter
is to be given effect without the invalid provision or application." 1987 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 5. Thus, the
legislature has acknowledged that unforeseen issues in the application of statutes such as the one involving
statutory marriage might arise.
1J21 The facts of this case would appear to have been far from the legislature's contemplation when the
statute recognizing unsolemnized marriages was enacted.** So far as the limited legislative history shows,
the apparent aim was to give Utah's Office of Recovery Services an avenue to prevent the exclusion of an
alleged "common law" spouse's income when an application for government benefits was made, thus
preventing welfare fraud. See Floor Debate, remarks of Norman Angus, Director of State Social Services
Admin., 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 17, 1987) (Sen. Recording No. 75).^ Utah has no doctrine of
common law marriage, and thus a statutory creation was necessary. The subsection of the statute concerning
the amount of time allotted for adjudication of a petition after the relationship's termination was added in an
amendment and was apparently designed to protect the parties to a putative marriage from fraud or mistake
due to long delays in adjudication. The only substantive comment on the amendment appears to be the
following:
This amendment. . . brings in a time focus, the other protection that Senator Reese put in the
bill yesterday provides that that determination of common law marriage must occur by a court or
administrative agency during the relationship or within one year after its [sic] been terminated. I
think that gives the protection of having a marriage declared twenty years after the relationship
when the parties had no intention of a marriage. I think it would still give protection to the Office
of Recovery Services.
Floor Debate, remarks of Sen. Lyle Hillyard, 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 19, 1987) (Sen. CD No. 81B).
1J22 Senator Hillyard's remarks suggest that the legislature was concerned with situations in which the couple
never intended to be married but where, years later, most likely at the time that one of them dies, some party
is trying to prove the existence of such a marriage.
1J23 In construing a statute, our aim is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute
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was meant to achieve. See Craftsman Buildej^ Supply v. ButlejLMfg., 974 P.2d 1194,1201 (Utah 1999).
When doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, an analysis of the
act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions harmonized in accordance with the legislative intent
and purpose. See id, at 1202. '"One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will
look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of
the statute dealing with the subject.'" |^ount_a[n_State^eL&Xel. _Ca_y. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah
1989) (citation omitted). Further, we have "a duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to effectuate
legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities." Statev, Bell, 785 P.2d
390, 397 (Utah 1989).
1. Statute of Limitations
1J24 Conventional statutes of limitation run until the date on which an action is commenced. The question
raised in this action is whether the somewhat unusual language of section 30-1-4.5 was intended to create a
novel phenomenon: a statute of limitations not tolled by the filing of an action, so that an action filed in a
timely manner could still fail the limitation period due to delays in discovery or a court's crowded docket. The
legislature should not be deemed to have created such a potentially unfair rule without clear and convincing
language evidencing its intent to do so; the ambiguities created in this statute appear to be the result of
nothing more than inartful drafting. It is clear that the legislative purpose of preventing welfare fraud, which
gave rise to the time limitation, has nothing to do with Ms. Gonzalez's attempts to establish a statutory
marriage to Mr. Briceno, and that strict construction of the subsection regarding the completion of an
adjudication of the relationship no later than a year after it allegedly terminated does not further the
underlying purpose of the statute. We are not persuaded that the legislature meant to place the burden of
crowded court dockets, and other matters completely out of a petitioner's control, solely on the petitioner. In
fact, as noted above, in this case the trial was delayed at the beginning of 1997 because a criminal trial took
precedence at the last moment.
H25 A more reasonable interpretation of the legislature's intent, which would not upset the underlying purpose
of the statute, is that the statute is simply an ordinary statute of limitations which, like all statutes of limitation,
requires that an action for adjudication must be commenced within a year of the termination of the
relationship. This would still protect parties who never meant to be statutorily married from adjudications
many years after their relationship has ended, but without placing an undue burden on petitioners who cannot
control every circumstance in the judicial arena. In fact, even if the insurer had not intervened in this
uncontested action (a point addressed more fully below), given the court's initially scheduled trial date, the
petition would not have been decided within the one-year time-frame. It seems unlikely that the legislature
intended to create such a trap for the unwary, leading to the dismissal of timely filed, uncontested lawsuits.
H26 State and federal speedy trial acts provide some useful guidance in this area, inasmuch as they also
contain requirements that cases be resolved within specific time-frames. Section 77-1-6(1 )(h) of the Utah
Code, for example, requires that a trial begin within thirty days after arraignment if the accused is not posting
bail, as long as the court's other business presents no obstacle to this. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1)(h)
(1990). Even in the criminal trial context, however, where the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are
implicated, the United States Supreme Court has declined to establish "rigid time requirements" to determine
whether a defendant'srightto a speedy trial was violated. See State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 208 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (citing Barker v. Wingo. 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972)). The Court in Barker outlined a four-part test to
assess any violation, including "[1] [IJength of the delay, [2] the reason for the delay, [3] the defendant's
assertion of hisright,and [4] prejudice to the defendant." Barker. 407 U.S. at 530. Thus, even when a party
has a constitutional right to a speedy trial, delay will be excused where it is not prejudicial. Were the
intervenor in this case entitled to such concern, which of course it is not, the "delay" here would not rise to the
level of being overly lengthy or prejudicial. Indeed, Metropolitan could not demonstrate any prejudice in this
case. Moreover, as Ms. Gonzalez has pointed out, without the insurer's intervention any delays would have
been unlikely, except to the extent that they were caused by the court's own docket.
2. Constitutional.Considerations
H27 Were we to accept intervener's claim that the legislature meant to create an entirely new type of statute
of limitations, the statutory time limitation would be subject to constitutional challenge. For example, in White
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v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Jnsurance_Cg., 907 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Tex. 1995), the court had to apply
a similar Texas statute. The case involved a woman suing her auto insurer under the uninsured motorist
clause of her policy, regarding the death of her alleged common law husband. The Texas statute stated: '"A
proceeding in which a marriage is to be proved under this section must be commenced not later than one
year after the date on which the relationship ended
"' I d at 1017 (quoting Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 1.91(b)
(West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).®
U28 The court in White held the Texas one-year statutory limitation period unconstitutional under the United
States Constitution on equal protection grounds. The court found that the statute made a distinction between
"ceremoniously married persons" and "informally or common-law married persons," and that the one-year
period to commence an action must be reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. See White,
907 F. Supp. at 1017-18. Finding that the interest in requiring proof of the existence of a common law
marriage in a timely fashion was to insure that Texas courts did not have to rely on stale evidence in divorce
and probate proceedings, the court reasoned that while the interest was legitimate, the statutory scheme was
not rationally related to the goals. See id. at 1018.
1129 Noting the severity of the bar to commencing an action to prove a common law marriage within just oneyear of the relationship's termination, the White court was particularly concerned about the community
property rights that would be extinguished and the legitimacy of the two children of the marriage that would be
unresolved. See idL The court relied on a United States Supreme Court case that held a similar Texas statute
regarding a one-year period to prove the legitimacy of a child violated equal protection because the time
period was too short in light of the important rights involved. See id.; Mills v. Habluetzel. 456 U.S. 91, 100
(1982).^ But see Shepford, 926 S.W.2d at 405-09 (applying, without mentioning White, the Texas statute
involved in White according to its terms).
1130 In light of the considerations discussed above, we construe the statute of limitations in question to avoid
potential unconstitutionality, and conclude that section 30-1-4.5 requires only the filing of a petition for
adjudication of marriage within one year after the termination of the relationship. Our decision rests on our
analysis of the legislature's intent, and therefore, we do not reach the constitutional arguments raised by Ms.
Gonzalez. See Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 45.11, at 49 (rev. 5th ed. 1992). Further, in light of our
ruling, we do not reach the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Ms. Gonzalez's motion to amend
her second petition. Should Ms. Gonzalez still wish to amend after remand, she should renew her motion, and
we presume the court will give her motion due consideration in light of this opinion. Typically, motions to
amend are liberally granted. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1183 (Utah 1993).
INTERVENTION
1J31 Next, we turn to Ms. Gonzalez's contention that it was error for the trial court to deny her motion to
dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention. Gonzalez initially challenged Metropolitan's motion to
intervene, but later reversed course and stipulated to the intervention.
1J32 Stipulations between the parties are usually honored by the courts. See First of Denver Mortgage
Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs.. 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979). Nevertheless, the courts may ignore
such agreements "when points of law requiring judicial determination are involved." Id. No consideration was
undertaken by the trial court of Metropolitan's standing to intervene in Ms. Gonzalez's petition to adjudicate
marriage; nevertheless, the question of the legitimacy of Metropolitan's presence in this lawsuit implicates
significant public policy concerns that should be addressed on appeal.
1133 Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), an applicant must be allowed to intervene if four
requirements are satisfied: (1) the application is timely; (2) the applicant has an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant is so situated that the disposition of
the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest; and (4)
the applicant's interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties.
1J34 Spouses are ordinarily the only appropriate parties to divorce litigation. See Frank D. Wagner,
Annotation, Divorce-Third Parties' Claims. 63 A.LR.3d 373, 378 (1975). An exception to this is generally
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made, however, for third-party claims that concern the "actual or equitable ownership of real property, or to
some other asserted interest such as an encumbrance upon real property, or the ownership of personal
property." id. (footnotes omitted). This case, which concerns a petition for adjudication of marriage, is
analogous to cases where a third party attempts to intervene in a divorce action. The threshold question here,
for both the requirements of rule 24(a) and intervention in a marriage context, is whether Metropolitan has an
interest relating to a property or transaction which is the subject of the action.
T|35 Metropolitan never alleged any "interest" in any property or transaction relating to the subject matter of
the petition. In its complaint in intervention, prior to the stipulation, Metropolitan stated as its basis for
intervention that it "believes that this petition is filed as an attempt to defraud an insurance company by
falsely attempting to establish a marriage where none existed." This is clearly not an acceptable reason for
intervening as of right in a proceeding to establish the existence of a marriage. Laudable as attempting to
prevent fraud is, it does not approach the type of property interest that is typically contemplated by courts
considering this issue in the context of an intervener's application in a divorce proceeding.
1J36 Looking to the treatment of this issue in other jurisdictions, we find that while most allow intervention in
divorce proceedings, such intervention is granted only after the intervenor meets a heavy burden. Analyzing
an identical intervention rule in West Virginia, the court found that "[a] third party seeking intervention in a
divorce proceeding for the purpose of protecting a property interest assumes the burden of demonstrating an
interest which will outweigh the substantial privacy interests of the divorcing parties." Boyle v. Boyle. 459
S.E.2d 401, 404 (W. Va. 1995). In Boyle, the court denied intervention to a third party claiming a right to buy
stock obtained by the wife as part of the divorce settlement. See id. at 405. Embracing the rationale of the
Boyle court, another court recently allowed the second wife to intervene in a proceeding brought by the first
wife, challenging the validity of her divorce settlement. See Cohen v. Cohen. No. 98-CA-00750-SCT, 1999
Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. Sept. 16, 1999). There, the court stressed (at least seven times in one form or
another) the "rare fact driven" nature of this case and that it is a significant departure from the normal rule.
See id. at **2, 3, 9, 13,14-16. At the outset of its discussion in Cohen, the court made it clear that under its
intervention rule, identical to our own, "an economic interest alone in the litigation is insufficient to allow
intervention." Id. at *7 (citations omitted).
TJ37 Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar rationale. For instance, in In re Marriage of Perkinson. 498
N.E.2d 319 (III. App. Ct. 1986), an order of dissolution of marriage was entered shortly before the former
husband drowned while working on his employer's tugboat. The employer, however, potentially liable for the
drowning death of the man, was not permitted to intervene in an action seeking to set aside the order of
dissolution. See id, at 324. The court reasoned that though the former wife might bring a wrongful death
action against the employer if the dissolution order was set aside, the employer's current interest in any future
action that she might bring was at most "speculative, hypothetical, and incidental." Id.
H38 Likewise, in Fishery. Fisher, 546 N.W.2d 354, 358 (N.D. 1996), the court found that the children of
divorcing parents did not have arightto intervene in their divorce proceedings regarding the appointment of a
receiver for their closely held company, even if such appointment might affect the value of the children's
shares in the company. The court's analysis begins by stating that "[a] 'direct' interest is one that is not
'remote' or 'contingent.'" Id. at 356 (citing 3B James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice H 24.07[2], at 24-54
(2d ed. 1995)). It continues, "[a] 'legally protective' interest is one that 'the substantive law recognizes as
belonging to or being owned by the applicant."' Id. (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line.
732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir.), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 1019 (1984) (emphasis in original)). Finally, the court
states that "[a] party who qualifies as a Veal party in interest* under rule 17(a), F.R. Civ. P., is a party with a
'legally protective' interest." Id (citing 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1543, at 339
(2d ed. 1990)) ("[T]he real party in interest requirement... must be satisfied for purposes of asserting . . . a
claim by an intervenor."). Since the court found that the valuation of minority shares in a close corporation
was a speculative undertaking, it held that the children did not have an interest in their parents' property that
was "direct, substantial, and legally protective." Id. at 356.^
1J39 The claims of the parties who attempted to intervene in these actions are entirely analogous to those of
the insurer in the present action. The privacy interests of a couple in determining their status and property
rights without the interference of outside parties are clearly paramount. Certainly, Metropolitan's "interest" in
this action is no greater than the employer in Perkinson. who was likely to be sued if the order of dissolution
was set aside.
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fl40 Many of the cases denying intervention also find that it would be possible for the intervenor to bring a
separate action to enforce any alleged rights, thereby avoiding their inappropriate insinuation into the private
affairs of a married couple. See Ex parte Kirkley, 418 So. 2d 118,121 (Ala. 1982) (former wife could not
intervene in former husband's subsequent divorce proceeding to obtain any money owed her under their
divorce decree, but rather could file contempt suit); Fi_sher, 546 N.W.2d at 358; Boyle, 459 S.E.2d at 405.®*
1141 Metropolitan has failed to show any interest in this action that requires its intrusion into an otherwise
pnvate matter between two persons regarding the nature of their relationship. In fact, as petitioner argues,
Metropolitan denied Ms. Gonzalez's insurance claim during the pendency of the proceedings below, making it
clear that it could proceed without the court's adjudication of this matter. Accordingly, adopting the rationale of
the court in Boyle, I would hold that the trial court erred in permitting Metropolitan to intervene, and that it
should have granted Ms. Gonzalez's motion to dismiss. As noted earlier, this view is joined only by Justice
Stewart, and a majority of the court affirms on this question.
PROCEDURE ON REMAND
1J42 Having found that section 30-1-4.5 requires only that an action to determine or establish a marriage be
commenced within a year of the termination of the relationship, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Metropolitan on the issue of the statute of limitations.
1(43 On remand, should Gonzalez choose to proceed with the petition for adjudication of marriage, the trial
court should apply a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof to the establishment of a marriage
under the statute. See Hansenv, Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 935-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). While no single factor
is determinative in the trial court's analysis, and while "numerous factors should be considered," evidence
proving each of the five statutory elements is essential. SeeWhyte v. Blair. 885 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1994).
The parties must make a showing of capacity to marry, capacity to give consent, assumption of marital rights
and duties, cohabitation, and a holding out as, and acquiring a uniform and general reputation as, husband
and wife. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1 -4.5(1 )(a)-(e) (1998). One commentator has noted "the success of the
common law marriage doctrine, and especially of the requirement of 'holding out,' in distinguishing between
cases in which the parties' intent was marriage and those in which they cohabited without any such intent."
Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage. 1996 Or. L. Rev. 709,
749 (1996). At trial, the court will have to determine whether Ms. Gonzalez meets this standard. The dispute
regarding the existence of a "uniform" reputation is a material fact in this case and to the extent that the trial
court's grant of summary judgment was based on that ground, it may not stand.
1J44 Although not discussed by any party to this appeal, we note a point that may assist in the disposition of
the case on remand. On March 26,1999, after the entry of summary judgment in this case, Gonzalez filed an
action in federal district court against Metropolitan, alleging various contractual and tortious causes of action
related to its insurance policy. It is not clear from the complaint in that case whether the claim therein relies
on the case of Proctor v. Insurance Co. of North America. 714 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1986), but it appears that this
case is highly instructive. In Proctor, two claimants disputed the disbursement of the proceeds of two
insurance policies. See id. at 1157. The policies did not name a beneficiary by name, but they both insured
the "member and spouse." Id. At the time the policies were purchased, the insured was married to his second
wife. His divorce, however, from his first wife was not finalized until nine months after his ceremony of
marriage to his second wife. Thus, the second marriage was illegal. See id. at 1158.
fl45 In response to the first wife's contention that her minor daughter was therightfulclaimant under the
policy, the court held that the principles of contract and insurance governed in this instance, and since the
second wife was clearly the intended beneficiary, she should receive the proceeds of the policy. See id The
court in Proctor noted, among other things, that the insured was required to pay additional premiums for
coverage for his "spouse." See ij± at 1159. Proctor was not cited by either party in the case before us, but we
note that it has a direct bearing on Metropolitan's obligation to Gonzalez under its policy, and further that,
while a successful adjudication of marriage in state court would presumably determine her federal court
claims, it would also not be a sine qua non for such a determination. Proctor appears to stand for the
proposition that in some circumstances one who is not legally married may nevertheless be a "spouse" for
purposes of coverage in an insurance policy, depending on the language of the policy and the intent of the
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parties. See id^ at 1158-59.
CONCLUSION
1J46 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, but reversed on the statute of limitations issue, and the
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

fl47 Justice Stewart concurs in Associate Chief Justice Durham's opinion.

ZIMMERMAN^Justice, concurring:
1J48 I concur in that portion of the opinion of Associate Chief Justice Durham that holds that a proceeding for
the determination of marriage must be commenced within a year, but not completed. That is a more
reasonable interpretation of the statute, and it seemingly protects the state's interest in avoiding fraud.
1J49 I concur in that portion of Justice Russon's opinion to the extent it holds that intervention pursuant to the
stipulation was properly permitted. Justice Durham looks to cases from other jurisdictions concerning
interventions in divorce proceedings for guidance, and then applies those rules and policies to a proceeding
to determine a marriage, labeling the situations "analogous." She would hold that a party in Metropolitan's
situation cannot be permitted to intervene, even on stipulation, because it would violate public policy. I cannot
accept the easy public policy analogy Justice Durham draws between determination of marriage actions
under the Utah statute and actions brought to end an existing legal marriage, particularly where the
proceeding to determine a marriage appears to have been commenced solely to give Gonzalez legal
entitlement to claim under the insurance policy and to sue Metropolitan. In such a situation, I would hold that
the company's interest is not so speculative that Gonzalez cannot be permitted to agree to have the
company's challenges adjudicated in the determination proceeding. It may have been tactically unwise for
Gonzalez to have stipulated to the intervention in that context, but she did so. I see no overriding public policy
against permitting that stipulation to be made effective.
1J50 Unlike Justice Russon, however, I would not address the broader question of when third parties may
properly be permitted to intervene in adjudications concerning a marriage over the objections of a party to the
actual or putative marriage in question. Therefore, I do not join in that portion of Justice Russon's opinion.

RUSSON, Justice, dissenting:
1J51 I dissent from Justice Durham's lead opinion. I would affirm all of the trial court's rulings.
1J52 First, the trial court did not err in dismissing Gonzalez's petition for failure to meet the jurisdictional time
limitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5. Justice Durham's opinion does not even attempt to read the
statute on the basis of its plain language, but instead simply rewrites its provisions by attributing motives to
the legislature. Although the requirement relating to conclusion, rather than commencement, of legal
proceedings is unusual and could potentially raise constitutional concerns in certain hypothetical scenarios,
this case is not one of them. Gonzalez had thirteen years in which to commence a petition for adjudication
and failed to do so. Moreover, after filing her petition, she made no attempt to obtain an adjudication within
the time limit. The trial court specifically found that an accelerated schedule could have been arranged if
Gonzalez had sought one. This is not a case where petitioner was prevented from meeting the statutory
deadline by events wholly beyond her control. Rather, it is evident from the record that Gonzalez simply failed
to recognize the nature of the time limitation and falsely assumed it functioned as a traditional statute of
limitations that had been satisfied at the time the petition was filed. It is not the constitutional duty of this court
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to rescue parties from their inability to read the plain language of a statute. I would affirm the court's decision
in view of the particular facts of this case.
1J53 Second, as recognized by Justice Zimmerman's opinion, the trial court correctly denied Gonzalez's
motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint. Although Justice Durham undertakes an analysis of the standard
of review relating to contested motions to intervene as of right, she fails to correctly reference the standard of
review for the only question property brought to us on appeal: the court's refusal to set aside the stipulation for
intervention. She thus attempts to establish a new standard of review for a question not property brought
before us on appeal. This purported establishment of a new standard of review has not been joined by a
majority of this court.
fl54 Justice Durham implicitly relies on our statement in First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel &
Associates. 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979), that a "court" is not bound by stipulations between parties "when
points of law requiring judicial determination are involved."^ Durham Op. H 32. However, this statement in
First of Denver (whatever it means) clearly does not empower us to review de novo a trial court's decision to
set aside a stipulation as to matters of law. Rather, First of_Denver recognizes that the trial court-not the
Supreme Court-is entrusted with the discretion whether to honor such a stipulation between parties. Indeed,
as we further stated in that case, whether a stipulation involves issues of fact or law, "[pjarties are bound by
their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the [trial] court, which has the power to set aside a stipulation
entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause." Id.; see also 73 Am. Jur. 2d Stipulations § 13, at 548
(1974) ("It is generally recognized that it is within the discretion of the court to set aside a stipulation of the
parties relating to the conduct of a pending cause."). As a result, a stipulation not set aside below will be
reversed on appeal only if the trial court abused its discretion. The well-established abuse of discretion
standard of review requires us to "presume that the discretion of the trial court was property exercised unless
the record clearly shows the contrary." Gpddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . ^
H55 Employing the correct standard of review, I would uphold the trial court's ruling denying Gonzalez's
petition to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint. In this case, the trial court carefully reviewed the particular facts
and circumstances before it and rendered a reasoned opinion refusing to set aside the stipulation. It found
there was a sound legal basis for Metropolitan's intervention and that Gonzalez had failed to meet her burden
of showing why the stipulation should be set aside.*12*
1J56 Finally, I would hold that Metropolitan has a right to intervene in this action. Contrary to Justice Durham's
assertion, this case is not "analogous to cases where a third party attempts to intervene in a divorce action."
Durham Op. U 34. In a divorce action, the status of the marriage relationship (and the attendant legal and
personal interests that attach to that relationship) have already been established. Because divorce constitutes
such a fundamental alteration in the lives of a husband and a wife, the law justifiably presumes that a divorce
will be sought for legitimate personal reasons. Intervention in divorce cases is typically sought by creditors
who claim that their interests are implicated by the disposition of the spouses' financial assets. Such
interventions are disfavored because they present a substantial risk of confusing the central issues relating to
the parties' already-established private relationship. Moreover, the likelihood that parties to a marriage will
seek a divorce for the sole or primary purpose of defrauding or damaging a creditor is smallP& Hence, courts
properly impose more stringent standards when entertaining applications for intervention in divorce cases.
TJ57 The reasons for denying intervention in most divorce cases manifestly do not apply to the facts of this
particular case. In this case, Metropolitan specifically alleged a fraudulent basis for the marriage petition. In
its complaint in intervention, Metropolitan asserts that "Juanita Gonzalez's sole purpose in filing this petition is
to attempt to create a relationship of husband and wife between herself and Martin Briceno for the sole
purpose of obtaining insurance coverage under a policy issued by Metropolitan to Martin Briceno." In other
words, Metropolitan contends that Gonzalez and Briceno had not actually met the criteria of the unsolemnized
marriage statute at the time of the fire and that they did not actually believe they met the criteria. If this
contention is proven correct, Gonzalez's attempt to retroactively establish a legal status for the sole purpose
of obtaining insurance benefits would constitute fraud and manipulation of a state statute. I submit that, where
there is a good faith assertion that a petition to validate an unsolemnized marriage is filed for fraudulent
purposes, the principles governing permissive intervention and the statutory policies underlying the marriage
statute grant a right of intervention. A party clearly has a right of intervention in an action that was brought for
the sole purpose of defrauding that party.&^

http://courtlink.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/gonzalez.htm

4/7/00

1158 Given the fact that Metropolitan is alleging a fraudulent basis for the petition, and because the retroactive
establishment of an unsolemnized maniage does not proceed from the same presumptions of the established
legal status inherent in any divorce action, no special heightened burden applies to Metropolitan's application
for intervention. Consequently, the issues regarding the right of intervention are governed by the traditional
standards of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).
1159 According to that rule, the four traditional requirements for intervention are met. First, there is no dispute
that the application was timely; second, Metropolitan has a clear interest in avoiding the payment of
fraudulent insurance claims; third, Gonzalez's petition may impair that interest if Metropolitan does not have
the opportunity to demonstrate that the petition has been brought for fraudulent purposes; and fourth, no party
other than Metropolitan has a clear interest or opportunity to present evidence demonstrating that Gonzalez's
petition is fraudulent.
U60 The trial court correctly dismissed Gonzalez's petition for failure to meet the time limitation in Utah Code
Ann. § 30-1-4.5; it did not abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez's request to ignore her stipulation; and it
correctly refused to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention. I would affirm the trial court on all
grounds.
1f61 Finally, I write to express my disapproval of Justice Durham's apparent attempt to give legal advice to
one of the parties. She states in her section titled "Procedure on Remand" that "[ajlthough not discussed by
any party to this appeal, we note a point that may assist in the disposition of the case on remand." Durham
Op. H 44. However, the issue she thereafter discusses has nothing to do with any disputed legal question this
court believes is likely to occur on remand to the district court. SeeState v.JLames, 819 P.2d 781, 795 (Utah
1991). Rather, she provides an advisory opinion that is apparently exclusively related to collateral and
factually distinct proceedings in federaLcourt. She does so under the apparent presumption that petitioner's
counsel has failed to locate relevant, perhaps even dispositive, authority relating to petitioner's federal claim.
This court has no business giving such advice to parties represented by counsel. Nor can we provide such
advice to a federal court when no questions have been properly certified from that court. See Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(1) (1996).

1J62 Chief Justice Howe concurs in Justice Russon's dissenting opinion.
1163 Justice Stewart acted on this opinion prior to his retirement.
1. The 1998 version of the statute is exactly the same as the statute originally passed in 1987.
2. The majority of federal appeals courts follow a de novo standard of review when intervention as of right is
involved. See Northwest Fores!Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 1996) (intervention
as of right reviewed de novo); AJam^aJ/VatejiSLSanitatioiiDist^v. Browner, 9 F.3d 88, 90 (10th Cir. 1993)
(same); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 960 F.2d 83, 85 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. TexasEastem
Tjmsmjssion Corp., 923" F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1991); Grubbs v.Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989)
(same); Walters v. City_otAtlan±a, 803 F.2d 1135,1151 n.16 (11th Cir. 1986) (reviewing denial of motion to
intervene as of right "for error"); Cook v. Booretin, 763 F.2d 1462,1468 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding application
for intervention as of right seems to pose only question of law, but "we would ordinarily . . . give substantial
weight to a trial court's findings" regarding whether intervention comports with efficiency and due process).
But see ln_re_Siejnra Club, 945 F.2d 776, 779 (4th Cir. 1991) (utilizing abuse of discretion standard).
While several other circuits appear to be adopting an abuse of discretion standard, they make distinctions
between intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The standard seems to inhabit an area
somewhere between de novo review and abuse of discretion when intervention as of right is involved. See
internationaLPaper C a y. Town ofJay, 887 F.2d 338, 345 (1st Cir. 1989); Ham's v._Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592,
597 (3d Cir.), cert_denjed, 484 U.S. 947 (1987); United States_v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Cojp., 749 F.2d
968, 990-91 (2d Cir. 1984).
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3. The statute sets forth the following criteria that must be met in establishing the existence of an
unsolemnized marriage:
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or
administrative order establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting parties who: a) are
capable of giving consent; b) are legally capable of entering into a solemnized marriage under the provisions
of this chapter; c) have co-habited; d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and, e) who
hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1998).
4. While the form of unsolemnized marriage recognized by Utah was created only relatively recently by
statute, its roots are long and deep, lying in the common law concept of "common laW marriage. There
appears to be no meaningful distinction between Utah's statutory scheme and the concept of common law
marriage.
5. For a fuller discussion of the legislative history of section 30-1-4.5, see Recent Developments in Utah Law
^Legislative Enactments^Fami_ly_Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 273.
6. The court in White noted that although the 1989 version of the Texas statute had been recently amended,
the earlier version of the statute specifically instructed that the 1995 amendment not be retroactively applied.
See White, 907 F. Supp. at 1017 n.2 (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 1.91(b) (West Supp. 1996) (Act of May
29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 891, § 1)). The 1995 amendment extended the statute of limitations to two
years, and by the terms of the amendment, even that time period is not absolute. See Shepfgrd v. Ledford,
926 S.W.2d 405, 409 n.1 (Tex. App. 1996).
7. The constitutionality of the one-year statutory limitation period is not before us on this appeal, since Ms.
Gonzalez concededly filed her petition within one-year of the termination of her relationship. Metropolitan
argues that the case of Bun^j^Jin^ehoro, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), is dispositive here and
stands for the proposition that a petition for adjudication of marriage must be brought and decided within a
year of the relationship's termination. Intervenor misconstrues this case. In Bunch, a divorce action was filed
ten months after the parties separated, i d at 919. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
no statutory marriage had been established and it therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
Id. On appeal, the court of appeals explicitly refused to consider constitutional arguments raised by the
appellant, stating that these arguments were not sufficiently articulated below. Id at 621. Finding section 301-4.5 to be unambiguous regarding the time limitation, it affirmed the trial court. Id We agree with Ms.
Gonzalez that her case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as it involves a petition to establish a marriage,
not to obtain a divorce. We believe that today we begin to clarify some of the issues left unresolved by the
court in Bunch. However, since the constitutionality of a one-year statute of limitations is not before us, we
express no opinion on the issue.
8. See aLso Arnold v._Arnold, 332 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Neb. 1983) (denying intervention to parents of one of the
divorcing parties on grounds that they attempted to introduce into dissolution proceeding a number of legal
actions involving themselves and divorcing parties that had nothing to do with division of marital assets);
Nieison v/Thompsgn, 982 P.2d 709, 712 (Wyo. 1999) (denying intervention to creditor where divorcing
husband had no "possessory or marketable interest" in his spouse's property, making payment of his debt to
creditor unavailable from such source).
9. Metropolitan would be able to contest its obligation in an action on the insurance contract, which is not
before us on this appeal.
10.1 must confess that the scope and import of this statement, as quoted in isolation by Justice Durham,
utterly escapes me. So far as I am aware, all disputed cases brought before courts involve "points of law
requiring judicial determination." Hence, a literal reading of this passage would require all courts everywhere
to disregard all stipulations for the sake of rendering a full-blown independent determination of the legal
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soundness of the parties' choices.
11. In this regard, Justice Durham states that the trial court failed to consider whether Metropolitan had
standing to intervene in this action. But Gonzalez did not appeal any alleged failure of the trial court to enter
specific findings that Metropolitan had standing to intervene at the time it approved the stipulation, nor is
there any indication that the trial court was obligated to do so. Rather, Gonzalez appeals the later denial of
her motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention. With respect to that motion, the court received
extensive briefing on Gonzalez's motion, heard oral argument, and entered findings of fact and rulings of law
that specifically treated Metropolitan's standing to intervene. There is no basis in those careful and correct
findings for us to attribute an abuse of discretion.
12. Gonzalez's primary argument in her motion was that she had been misled by Metropolitan's counsel into
believing there were no other potential bases in the insurance contract for denying her claims. The trial court
correctly found that Metropolitan had reserved itsrightto deny coverage under other provisions of the
contract and had notified Gonzalez that it reserved therightto do so from the outset.
13. It was suggested at oral argument that annulments might present a closer analogy and could be affected
by our decision here. Whether or not annulment is an adequate analogy, it does not alter the fundamental
policies governing intervention in the particular circumstances of this case. To the extent there is a properly
supported allegation that parties to a relationship are attempting to alter their legal status, where that status
(and the attendant privacyrightsit entails) isjridgubt, and they are attempting the alteration for the sole or
primary purpose of deceit or fraud (and the other criteria of rule 24 are met), a right of intervention should be
granted. Moreover, to the extent we find it necessary to craft particular rules to meet new circumstances, we
may do so when the proper case arises.
14. It is no answer to state, as does Justice Durham, that Metropolitan may litigate its concerns in the context
of a separate contract action on the insurance policy. Metropolitan obviously cannot litigate, in the context of
a separate contract dispute, a decision regarding marital status that has been established and recognized by
another court of competent jurisdiction.
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